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PRIVACY OR DIGNITY?:
ELECTRONIC MONITORING
IN THE WORKPLACE
Lawrence E. Rothstein*

I. INTRODUCTION

The growth of electronic surveillance in the workplace has been
phenomenal and has created a global problem. Such monitoring through
video equipment, point of sale technologies, computer terminals, magnetic
"active" badges, pen registers, telephone recording devices and numerical
control machines now allows access to most, if not all, employee
conversations and e-mail, and in many cases can record each movement or
keystroke of an employee.' While some of this recorded information is
presently unused, employers are resorting to it more and more. In the United
States, for example, a 1987 report by the Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment estimated that six to eight million persons were subjected to such
surveillance at work.2 A 1993 MacWorld study raised that estimate to 20
million workers. In 1996 the ACLU National Task Force on Civil Liberties
in the Workplace estimated that 40 million workers were subject to

*. Professor of Political Science and Associate of the Charles T. Schmidt, Jr. Labor

Research Center, University of Rhode Island; attorney and member of Rhode Island,
Massachusetts and Illinois bars. B.A. in Government, Carleton College, 1966; J.D.
University of Illinois College of Law, 1969; Ph.D. in Political Science, University of
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the International Industrial Relations Association, Bologna, Italy, September 25, 1998.
1. See generally Victoria Bellotti, Design for Privacy in Multimedia Computing and
CommunicationsEnvironments, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 63,
64-66 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997); Rebecca Quick, Not-So-PrivateLives,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1998, at R27.
2. See U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR: NEW

TECHNOLOGY, NEW TENSIONS 102-4 (1987).

3. See Charles Piller, Bosses with X-Ray Eyes: Special Report on Electronic Privacy,
MACWORLD, July 1993, at 120-22.
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electronic surveillance.' These estimates do not include the large number of
employees subject to electronic monitoring of their telephone usage and
conversations in such fields as telemarketing, financial and communication
services. Including workers in these fields where monitoring is the norm, the
American Management Association estimated that nearly two-thirds of
medium to large businesses practiced one or more forms of electronic
surveillance of their employees.'
The concern in the two other countries considered in this Article, France
and Italy, is manifest in their progressive efforts to limit surveillance and
enhance workers' control, as will be discussed below. For example, the
French national commission charged with registering nominative treatments
of data6 recorded 34,426 cases in 1993, the highest number of new cases
since 1982 and a 109% increase over 1990.' Since that time annual
registrations have grown each year.' Since its inception in 1978 through
December 31, 1997, the French commission has registered over 556,000
cases of businesses or government agencies collecting and electronically
processing data identifiable to particular persons.9 Of these cases,
approximately 45% relate to employees of the organizations doing the data
collection. "

This Article will undertake a comparison of the legal protection of
workers from electronic surveillance and monitoring because there is
markedly less protection in the United States than in the continental
European countries. 1 While the difference in strength of the U.S. and
European labor movements might partially account for this, the example of
France shows that even a continental European country with low union
density provides significantly greater protection to workers than does the
U.S. A Conference Board poll of its chief executive members along with
4. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (ACLU), SURVEILLANCE, INCORPORATED:
2 (special report 1996).

AMERICAN WORKERS FORFEIT PRIVACY FOR A PAYCHECK

5. See AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, ELECTRONIC MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE (1997) (visited Mar. 23, 2000) <http://www.amanet.org/survey/elec97.htm>.

6. See discussion infra Part IV.
7. See COMMISSION NATIONALE DE L'INFORMATIQUE ET DES LIBERTtS (CNIL), 14E RAPPORT
D'ACTIVITt

1993 16 (1994).

8. See Les EntreprisesSurveillentde Pr~sleurs Salaris,LEPARISIEN, April 24, 1998 at A5.
9. See La CNIL, A quoi sert la CNIL? Rdcenser les Fichiers,(1999) (visited Mar. 23, 2000)

<http://www.cnil.fr/cnil/cnil21 .htm>.
10. See CNIL, 19E RAPPORT D'ACTwIT 1998 17 (1999).
11. See Colin Bennett, Convergence Revisited: Towarda GlobalPolicyfor the Protection
ofPersonalData?,in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THENEwLANDSCAPE, 99, 113-14 (Philip
E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997); Paul M. Schwartz, EuropeanDataProtectionLaw
and Medical Privacy, in GENETIC SECRETS 397 (Mark A. Rothstein ed. 1997).
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their Canadian and European counterparts has indicated that, while a
majority of CEOs see electronic surveillance as ineffective and even
detrimental to employee morale, the percentage holding these opinions is
much higher in Canada and Europe than in the U.S. 12 At least in part, the
difference in legal protection stems from a differing conception of what
values are being protected. In the U.S. the value of privacy is most
13
frequently mentioned with regard to protection against surveillance; in
continental Europe (and countries influenced by continental labor law), the
value most frequently mentioned in the electronic surveillance context is
human dignity.14 This Article shall argue that the legal protection of workers
from electronic monitoring would be better served by deriving those
protections from a concept of "human dignity" rather than of "privacy." It
will proceed by first sketching the outline and origin of the two concepts and
then by demonstrating their embodiment in legal texts regarding surveillance
and monitoring in the workplace.
II. PRIVACY

The U.S. legal treatment of the concept of privacy is most akin to the
philosophical perspective outlined by Ernest Van Den Haag. Van Den
Haag's analysis exemplifies the possessive and territorial view of privacy.
He notes that "[p]rivacy is best treated as a property right. Property grants
an owner the exclusive right to dispose of what he owns. Privacy is the

12. See DONALD E. BERENBEIM, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY 2 (Conference Board Research Report
No. 945, 1990).
13. For example, the classic Fourth Amendment "reasonable expectation of privacy"
analysis used in cases of governmental wiretapping and surveillance. See e.g., Katz v. U.S.,
389 U.S. 347 (1967), California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); and the employment cases,
see e.g., Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 419 (5t Cir. 1980), Watkins v.
L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 583 (11"' Cir. 1983), Epps v. St. Mary's Hosp. of Athens,
Inc., 802 F.2d 412,416-17 (1 1' Cir. 1986), that distinguish the monitoring of personal calls,
deemed private, from business calls.
14. An example is the German Constitutional Court (BVerfG) and the Supreme Labor Court
(BAG) have on several occasions confirmed that the German Constitution (Basic Law),
Article 1, Section 1, (which states: "Human dignity is inviolable. To respect and protect it
is the duty of all state authority") and Article 2, Section 1 (which states: "Everyone has the
right to the free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of
others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral law") together establish
protections for informational self-determination and autonomy of citizenis and workers with
respect to both government and private parties. See Judgment ofJuly 16, 1969, 27 BVerfGE
1; Judgment of June 21, 1977, 45 BVerfGE 187, 229; Judgment ofDecember 15, 1983, 65
BVerfGE 1; and Judgmentof October 22, 1986, 53 BAGE 226, 233. See French and Italian
examples in the text to follow.
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exclusive right to dispose of access to one's proper (private) domain. 5 In an
influential 1960 treatment, which still captures the legal treatment of privacy
in U.S. law, William Prosser, former Dean of Boalt Hall Law School and
noted commentator on U.S. tort law, placed the legal recognition of privacy
tort claims into four categories. The one most relevant to our discussion of
electronic surveillance and monitoring in the workplace was the "[i]ntrusion
upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs. ' 6 The
intrusion could be physical or electronic, but it had to be into an area which
a reasonable person would find offensive or highly objectionable. 7
Furthermore, the person intruded upon may lose, by consent or18the existence
of a special legal relationship, their right not to be so treated.
Privacy, in this sense, highlights a "possessive individualism."' 9 Privacy
implies notions of property, individualism, ownership and expectations with
regard to the exclusion of outsiders without specific legal rights to the work
premises."0 The protection of privacy connotes the possession by each
individual of a zone of intimacy into which outsiders are not allowed to
penetrate without the permission of the individual or without an extremely
strong justification.2 1 Privacy is associated with one's home, with intimate
relations, and with premises under a person's control.22 More fundamentally,
this view ofprivacy stems from the individualist and property-oriented notion
that an individual is the proprietor or possessor of her or his own person and
capacities, for which nothing is owed to society.2 3 Privacy is territorial and
is seen as a possessive right that may be alienated preemptively and
wholesale.24 This possessive, territorial view of privacy finds clear expression
in the workplace.
When a worker sells her capacity to labor, she alienates certain aspects
of the person and puts them under the control of the employer. Thus in the
I.S., work rs in the wnrkplace, except occasonlly in restrooms and

15. See Ernest van den Haag, On Privacy, in PRIVACY: NOMOs Xffl 150, 151 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971).
16. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960).
17. See id. at 389-91.
18. Id. at 391.
19. See C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM 3 (1970).
20. See id.

21. See id. at 263.
22. See id. at 142, 264.
23. See id. at 3, 263.
24. See id. at 275; COLIN J. BENNETT, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PRIVACY: A REVIEW OF
THE LITERATURE 8 (Report for the Center for Social and Legal Research, Dep't Energy,
Human Genome Project 1995).
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employee locker rooms, 25 are not generally protected from surveillance on
the grounds that the premises and equipment are possessions of the employer
and the employee can have no legitimate expectation of intimacy or of
protection from employer intrusion. The employee, in the employment-atwill setting, has implicitly consented to the employer's right to monitor the
employee closely "for any reason, no reason, or even reason morally
wrong"2 6 or lose her job.
III. HUMAN DIGNITY

Where Anglo-American jurisdictions emphasize the concept of privacy
in their legal protection of workers from monitoring and surveillance,
continental European countries manifest a concept of human dignity more
related to notions of community and citizenship than property. 2' French,
Italian, German and Spanish do not even have a direct equivalent of the
English word 'privacy.' The concept of human dignity is a social one that
promotes a humane and civilized life. The protection of human dignity
allows a broader scope of action against treating people in intrusive ways.
While also concerned with intrusions upon a person's intimacy and
autonomy with regard to her or his private life, human dignity, unlike privacy
(at least as embodied in U.S. law), is primarily concerned with actions that
reduce a person's status as a thinking being, a citizen and a member of a
community.18 As Alan Westin stated in his earlier work linking autonomy
and dignity to advocate attention for privacy protection: autonomy is
grounded in a "fundamental belief in the uniqueness of the individual, in his
basic dignity and worth as a creature of God and a human being.. ." and
results in "the desire to avoid being manipulated or dominated wholly by
others., 29 At work, human dignity is denied by treating the employee as a
mere factor of production with fixed capacities and vulnerabilities
determining her behavior and ignoring both the worker's individuality in the

25. See Speer v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction, 624 N.E.2d 251, 254 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1993); Amoco Petroleum Additives Co. v. Jackson, 964 F.2d 706, 707 (7th Cir. 1992);
Doe by Doe v. B.P.S. Guard Services., Inc., 945 F.2d 1422 (8th Cir. 1991); Harkey v. Abate,
346 N.W.2d 74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, 88 So. 2d 716 (La.

Ct. App. 1956).
26. Payne v. Western & At. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884); See also Paul F.
Gerhart, Employee PrivacyRights in the UnitedStates, 17 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 175, 184 (1995).
27. See Madison Powers, Justice and Genetics: Privacy Protectionand the Moral Basis of
Public Policy, in GENETIC SECRETS 355, 365 (Mark A. Rothstein ed. 1997).
28. See Sonia Le Bris & Barta Maria Knoppers, Internationaland Comparative Concepts
of Privacy,in GENETIC SECRETS 418, 419, 424, 426 (Mark A. Rothstein ed. 1997).
29. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 33 (1967).
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face of statistical probabilities and the human potential to overcome or

compensate for physical obstacles. 30 The worker's dignity is denied when
she is treated as a mechanism transparent to the view of others at a distance
and therefore manipulable or disposable without the ability to confront the
observer.3 1

Since the 1970s, while in practice a zone of intense conflict, French
labor relations and labor law have focused on the notion of the enterprise as
a community and employers and employees as citizens of that community
with both rights and duties.32 Of course, what community meant to workers

and employers was different. But both views stemmed from the measures
seen as necessary for healing the scars of the political upheaval of 1968 and
for heading off a left-wing victory at the polls in 1974." 3
For the worker, the enterprise community meant the workplace. This
was a specific location where the employee's work and an extremely

important network of social relations were found. Self-discovery and selffulfillment were fundamental goals to be sought in the workplace in this
social network. Like an echo of the demand for worker self-management of
the 1960s, workers would come together in the workplace, form strong social
bonds, and assert their collective power to create a community that served
both their human and economic ends.34 While the worker might subordinate
herself to the employer by consent, that subordination was only for the
purpose of performing work-related tasks. As stated in an influential 1992
report by the dean of French labor lawyers, Gerard Lyon-Caen, beyond the
narrow confines of that subordination "in the rest of his life the worker

30. See Philip E. Agre, Beyond the Mirror World: Privacy and the Representational
Practices of Computing, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 29, 46-52

(Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds. 1997).
31. See Rohan Samaraj iva, Interactivityas though PrivacyMattered,in TECHNOLOGY AND
PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE, 277, 283-86 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds. 1997);
Edward J. Bloustein, Privacyas an Aspect ofHuman Dignity, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS
OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 6, 156 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman, ed. 1984); Larry 0. Natt
Gantt, An Affront to Human Dignity: Electronic Mail Monitoring in the Private Sector
Workplace, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 345, at text accompanying notes 440-64 (1995); Spiros
Simitis, From the GeneralRules on Data Protectionto a Specific Regulation of the Use of
Employee Data:PoliciesandConstraintsofthe European Union, 19 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y
J. 351, 358-60 (1998).
32. See Jean-Emmanuel Ray & Jacques Rojot, Worker Privacy in France, 17 COMP. LAB.
L.J. 61,62 (1995).
33. See LAWRENCE E. ROTHSTEIN, PLANT CLOSINGS: POWER, POLITICS, AND WORKERS

93-94, 100 (1986).
34. See id. at 102-3.
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remains free . . . even during the execution of his work."35 Furthermore,

Lyon-Caen argued, fundamental rights and liberties, particularly those that
could be considered rights of personality,36 cannot be abrogated by the
worker's consent or be alienated: "For his salary the worker exchanges
services, which are defined by the employer, but which leave intact a core
which corresponds, in a given epoch and a given civilization, to the idea of
human liberty."3 7 In particular, this meant the liberty and the necessary

conditions for French workers to form and maintain strong social bonds at
work with their comrades and to act collectively to influence the organization
and pace of work.38
The enterprise community, for the employer, was a much more
paternalistic concept.39 It stressed the role of the employer as the head of the
community, while conceding the duty of the patron to limit such brutal and
impersonal actions as mass layoffs and the duty to consult with workers prior
to major changes in the work processes or terms of employment. In addition,
for the first time, employers, hoping that this would give them more
flexibility, recognized the legality of workplace union organization and the
possible utility of collective agreements at the plant level. The employers
assumed that the interest of the enterprise community, for which all should
loyally strive, was the economic success of the business. The Socialist
electoral victories of 1981 and the long tenure of Socialist President
Mitterrand meant that the workers' viewpoint would have some influence
over the law and jurisprudence."n
The Italian Workers Statute of 1970,41 legislation also following a major
political upheaval, the "hot summer" of 1969, affirmed even more strongly
that the worker in the workplace enjoyed a right of personal dignity and an
autonomous private sphere of action. According to influential Italian legal
commentators, the rationale underlying the Workers Statute was that the
worker at work remains a human being whose fundamental rights and human

35. GtpARD LYON-CAEN, LEs LIBERTtS PUBLIQUES ET L'EMPLOI 154 (1992) (emphasis
added).
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 128.
39. See ROTHSTErN, supra note 33, at 102.
40. See id. at 104-5.
41. See Statuo dei Lavoratori, Law no. 300 of 20 May 1970, Giumale Ufficiale (Giur. Uff.),
May 27, 1970, no. 131 (visited Mar. 23, 2000) <http://www.unipa.it/-cdl/lexall/dcl/
70n300.txt>.
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The notion of dignitei humana in the

workplace encompassed freedom of expression, autonomy and freedom from
control by unidentified, impersonal or covert mechanisms.43 Article 4 of the
Workers Statute, prohibiting the electronic surveillance of workers, arose

from the idea that human dignity required that any monitoring of a person be
undertaken by a person, not an impersonal machine." Monitoring, even by
persons, must also be overt and not hidden, and proportional to a legitimate

business end.4 5 Human dignity was preserved when the worker was able to
confront the monitor, explain her activity to the monitor, understand the
monitor's perspective and influence the monitor by collective action. Thus

for the worker to maintain human dignity, she or he must be able to confront
the human dignity of the monitor.4 6
In France and Italy, unlike the U.S., there is legal recognition that private

power is as much an attack on dignity and liberty as is public power.4 7 In the
U.S., for example, certain protections related to privacy in the Fourth

Amendment are held to apply only against government action.48
Furthermore, the trend with regard to public employment in the U.S. has

been to reduce worker protections of privacy and autonomy to those found
in the private sector.4 9 In France, on the other hand, the trend has been the
reverse.5" The French Civil and Labor Codes now limit the restriction of

constitutional rights and liberties by anyone (i.e. public or private persons)."
One French commentator has noted that the law "considers that the

42. See Roberto Romei & Silvana Sciarra, The ProtectionofEmployees'Privacy:A Survey
ofltalian Legislationand Case Law, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 91 (1995).
43. See id. at 91-92.
44. See id. at 93-94.
45. See id.at 96-97, 99.
46. See Roberto Romei, Dirittoalla riservatezzadel lavoratoreed innovazionetecnologica,
15 QUADERNI DI DIRITTO DEL LAVORO E DELLE RELAZIONI INDUSTRIALI 67, 71-2 (1994);
Alessandro Bellavista, Diritti della persona e contratto di lavoro nella elaborazione
Giurisprudenziale,15 QUADERNI DI DIRi-rO DEL LAVORO E DELLE RELAZIONI INDUSTRIALI
197, 209 (1994).
47. See Le Bris & Knopfers, supra note 28, at 422-23; PIERRE KAYSER, LA PROTECTION DE
LA VIE PRIVEE 77-78 (3d ed. 1995); Bennett, supra note 11, at 106-7.
48. See S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the Public/Private Distinction: Employee
Monitoringin the Workplace, 32 GA. L. REV. 825, 828-30 (1998); David Neil King, Privacy
Issues in the Private Sector Workplace: Protectionfrom Electronic Surveillance and the
EmergingPrivacy Gap, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 441,443-44 (1994); Heather Hanson, The Fourth
Amendment in the Workplace: Are We Really Being Reasonable?, 79 VA. L. REV. 243,
243-48 (1993).
49. See Hanson, supra note 49, at 248-57.
50. See KAYSER, supra note 47, at 19.
51. See Le Bris & Knopfers, supra note 28, at 427-28.
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employee, although subordinated to the employer, always remains a free
citizen whose fundamental rights do not disappear when he is at his job."52
Similarly, the Italian Workers Statute expressly refers to rights against
government enshrined in the 1948 Constitution and applies them to workers
in both the public and private sectors.53 Also, like the U.S. Constitution, it
leaves much room for judicial interpretation.5 4
IV. FRENCH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
In France the use of electronic technologies to monitor work activity is
framed by three laws: the Law on Data Processing and Liberty, 55 which
regulates all automated treatments of data that identifies individuals; the
1970 amendment to Article 9 of the Civil Code56 protecting the right to
respect for private life; and the 1992 amendments to the Labor Code for the
protection of individual liberties in the enterprise.5 7 The 1992 amendments
were a reaffirmation and an expansion to the workplace of the principles of
the 1978 law and the 1981 Convention 108 of the Council of Europe.5 8
The protections for French workers are both procedural and substantive.
Section L432-2-1 of the French Labor Code requires that employers inform
and consult with the workers' council or other elected representatives of the
workers in advance of any decision to put institute or modify methods of
monitoring employees' activities, such as new technologies having important
consequences for conditions of employment and data processing techniques
related to personnel management.5 9
The Labor Code has also applied the procedural requirements of the Law
on Data Processing and Liberty to the workplace by requiring that an
employee be informed in advance of any automated treatment of information
identifying that employee and any automated techniques of professional

52. Olivier de Tissot, La Protectionde la Vie Priv~e du Salari6, 1995 DROIT SOCIAL 222,
230.
53. See Romei & Sciarra, supra note 42, at 91.
54. See Le Bris & Knopfers, supra note 28, at 430.
55. Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, J.O., Jan. 7, 1978, p. 227; 1978 D.S.L. 77.
56. Law No. 70-643 of July 17, 1970, J.O., July 19, 1970, p. 6751; 1970 D.S.L. 200.
57. Law No. 92-1446 of Dec. 31 1992, J.O., 1992, p. 19; 1992 D.S.L 110.
58. Convention of the Council of Europe for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, openedfor signatureJan. 28, 1981, Eur. T.S. No.
108, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 317 (1981). See also HUBERT BOUCHET, L'INFORMATIQUE
APPLIQU E AU CONTR6LE D'ACTIVITt ET A LA SURVEILLANCE SUR LES LIEUX DE TRAVAIL:
ENJEUX ET RISQUES POUR LA PROTECTION DE LA VIE PRIVtE DES SALARIES 6 (1995).

59. See C. TRAY. art. L.432-2-1.
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evaluation.6 ° Where such information is collected, the employee must be
advised whether the requested data is mandatory or optional; the employer
must provide access to the data and the right to correct errant data. The new
section L121-8 of the Labor Code specifies that no information concerning
an employee or candidate for employment may be collected unless the
employee is informed in advance of the means of collecting the data .61 The
1992 Law Aubry charged the Ministry of Labor's inspection division with
seeing that the Law on Data Processing and Liberty was observed in the
workplace by allowing the inspectors to investigate and bring a complaint to
the CNIL or directly to local prosecutors.62
The Law on Data Processing and Liberty of 1978 created the National
Commission on Data Processing and Liberty (CNIL) as the guardian of
fundamental rights affected by data processing techniques.63 The CNIL is
charged with monitoring all automated treatments of data that identifies
individuals. 64 It studies, makes rules concerning, and approves applications
for virtually all such treatments, public and private.65 The rules of the CNIL
require, in advance of the installation or modification of an automated
treatment of data that identifies individuals, the submission of a declaration
describing the data and its treatment, the business purposes of the treatment,
the procedures for informing interested parties, identification of those to
whom the data will be transmitted, and the safeguards for protecting
confidentiality. 66 The CNIL also receives complaints, conducts field
investigations and makes individual decisions concerning systems of data
collection and treatment.67 Interestingly enough, despite these very broad
powers, the operations of the CNIL are extremely independent of both the
government and the business sector due to an unusual political deadlock and
compromise at the time of its creation. It was created as the first French
independent administrative agency. 68 The power of appointment nf most

60. See de Tissot, supra note 52, at 225.
61. See C.TRAv. art. L.121-8.
62. See Ray & Rojot, supranote 32, at 68-73; BOUCHET, supra note 58, at 6-11; CNIL, Les
&outes t0l6phoniques, in INFORMATIQUE ET LIBERTtS: LIEU DE TRAVAIL 1-2 (1999).
63. See Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, J.O., Jan. 7, 1978, p. 227; 1978 D.S.L. 77.
64. See id. at art. 6.
65. See id. at arts. 14-22.
66. See id. at art. 19.
67. See id. at art. 21; cf CNIL, INFORMATIQUE ET LIBERTIS: DOCUMENTATION GtNIRALE
4-6 (Doc. no. 36-15 1996).
68. See David H. Flaherty, PROTECTING PRIVACY INSURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES: THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, SWEDEN, FRANCE, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES, 172-74,
188-91 (1989); Interview with Alain Chouraqui, Labor Sociologist, L.E.S.T./C.N.R. S., Aix-
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CNIL members was not given to the government in power, but to the
legislature and several independent courts and councils.69
The substantive protections for workers from electronic monitoring and
surveillance stem from the 1992 Law Aubry and to new life given to Art. 9
of the Civil Code"0 by the courts. The new Art. 120-2 of the Labor Code,
added by the Law Aubry, states simply: "No one may place restrictions on
the rights of persons and individual or collective liberties which are not
justified by the nature of the task to be accomplished and proportional to the
objective sought."7 1 That sentence, borrowed from a provision of the Labor
Code confined to work rules,7 2 introduces the notion that any restriction on
individual or collective rights must be directly related to and proportional to
the importance of a legitimate business interest. This notion is both broad
and vague, leaving substantial room for judicial interpretation. Similarly,
Article 9 of the Civil Code gives much leeway for judicial action. That
article states: "Everyone has a right to respect for his private life. The judges
may, without prejudice to compensation for injuries received, prescribe all
measures, such as injunctions, seizures or other means, appropriate for
preventing or halting an injury to the intimacy of private life; these measures,
in an emergency, may be ordered summarily."7 3
In the jurisprudential space created by these laws, the courts have been
active. The French courts have several times rejected the use of tapes from
4
hidden video cameras to prove the grounds for dismissal of an employee.
One outstanding case found the French Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation)
rejecting the dismissal of an employee where the evidence against the
employee was the tape from a hidden video surveillance camera that showed
the employee stealing from the register. The Court held that an employee

en-Provence (April 5, 1996) (on file with author); Guy BRAIBANT, DONNEES PERSONNELLES
ET SOCItTE DE L'INFORMATION: RAPPORT AU PREMIER MINISTRE SUR LA TRANSPOSITION EN

DROIT FRANCAIS DE LA DIRECTIVE No. 95/46 19 (Conseil d'Ittat 1998); cf CNIL, supra note

62, at 14.
69. Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978 at art. 8, J.O., Jan. 7, 1978, p. 227; 1978 D.S.L. 77.
70. See Law No. 92-1446 of Dec. 31 1992, J.O., 1992, p. 19; 1992 D.S.L 110; Convention
of the Council of Europe for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data, openedforsignatureJan. 28, 1981, Eur. T.S. No. 108, reprinted
in 20 I.L.M. 317 (1981); BOUCHET, supra note 58.
71. C.TRAv. art. L. 120-2.
72. See C.TRAv. art. L.122-35; Act of Aug. 4, 1982.
73. C.Civ. art. 9.
74. See de Tissot, supra note 52, at 226; Manuela Grevy, Vidosurveillance dans
l'Entreprise: un Mode Normal de Contr6le des Salaries? 1995 DROIT SOCIAL 329, 331
(1995); CNIL, La Vidosurveillancesur le Lieu de Travail, in INFORMATIQUE ET LIBERTIS:
LIEU DE TRAVAIL 1 (1997).
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may not be videotaped unless she or he is notified in advance of the taping
and there are exceptional circumstances that justify the videotaping, e.g.
repeated thefts.7 5 In another case, the Court of Appeals of Aix-en-Provence
rejected videotape evidence of the negligence of a dismissed employee on the
grounds that, given the easy availability of technologies to edit or forge
images, the tape was unreliable as evidence.76
In several cases, the courts have penalized employers for collecting or
processing electronic data concerning employees without informing the
employees in advance, consulting with the works council or submitting a
declaration to the CNIL.77 The Paris Criminal Court fined the CEO and a
data processing corporation for collecting and using performance statistics,
attributable to identified employees, from the data entry stations of the
operators."8 These statistics on numbers of keystrokes, numbers of
corrections and times elapsed were posted daily in the work area and
operators were evaluated and even dismissed based on the statistics.7 9 When
a dismissed operator brought this to the attention of a Ministry of Labor
Inspector, the Inspector investigated and obtained reinstatement for the
employee."° In addition the Inspector ascertained that the collection of these
statistics was not the subject of notification or consultation with the
employees or a submission to the CNIL, as the originally stated purpose was
to collect aggregate-not individually identifiable--data concerning the
operators."1 The case was brought to the local prosecutor resulting in a
conviction for failure to declare to the CNIL a nominative treatment of
electronically processed data and a fine of Fr 6000.82 While the law
prescribes penalties of up to 3 years in prison and fines of up to Fr 200,000,
the court's leniency was based on the fact that the collection of individually
identifiable statistics stopped immediately upon the intervention of the Labor
Inspector.8 3 Are French law and jurisprudence inspired by the idea of human

75. See SA Neocel, Cass. Soc., 20 Nov. 1991.
76. See P~rez c./SA Beli Intermarch , CA Aix-en-Provence, Jan. 4, 1994.
77. See generally Jean Fraysinnet, Nouvelles technologies et protection des libert~s dans
I'entreprise,1992 DROIT SOCIAL 596, 598-602 (no. spec. 1992); Ariane Mole, Au delb de la
loi informatique et liberts, 1992 DROIT SOCIAL 603, 607-8 (1992).
78. See MadameArnoult c./Socit SST, TC Paris (1 7e), Feb. 5, 1991, 1992 DROIT SOCIAL
541.
79. See Anne Hidalgo, Un nouveau r6le pour l'administrationdu travail? 1992 DROIT
SOCIAL 538, 540 n. 18 (1992).
80. See id. at 540.
81. See id. at 540-41.
82. See id. at 541, 543.
83. See id. at 542.
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dignity as suggested above? There are several important indications that the
answer to this question is yes. The 1975 Report of the Commission on Data
Processingand Liberty proposing the 1978 legislation discussed the threat
to human rights, identity and dignity posed by means of collecting and
treating personal data that are immeasurably more powerful and rapid than
those available in the past. 84 The first conclusion of the report was that an
agency be created to serve as the "social conscience" of the nation with
regard to the electronic collection and processing of personal data.8 5 Article
I of the 1978 law states that data processing "shall infringe neither human
identity nor the rights of man, nor private life, nor individual and public
liberties."8 6 While the language used in the legislation, and later European
Community documents heavily influenced by the French example, stressed
rights and liberties, these rights and liberties were seen as not only legal and
individual, but moral and collective.8 ' The reference to "human identity"
highlights an important element of human dignity. An influential study of
the 1978 law noted that "the reference to human identity is a reflection of the
concern over the homogenizing effect of data processing: over-generalization
may harmfully limit human individuality. A case in point would be the
characterization of an individual as a result of a few items of information. ,88
In the 1990s, concern that human dignity and identity were under attack
received even greater emphasis in the annual reports of the CNIL. The
increased use of new technologies for surveillance, monitoring and
information collection and the demands of European integration were seen
as a threat to the legal protections accorded French citizens through the work
of the CNIL.89 The foreword to the 1992 report of the CNIL's activities
noted that the use of surveillance technologies touches not only a person's
liberties, but also her or his "identity itself."90 It went on to note that if
protections for citizens are reduced in the future, "mankind will be
diminished." 91 The 1993 annual report warned of "the web which, with the
advancement of technology, is woven little by little around each individual"

See 1 RAPPORT DE LA COMMISSION INFORMATIQUE ET LIBERTIS 11-13 (1975).
See id. at 10.
Act 78-17 of 6 January 1978, Art. 1.
See Le Bris & Knopfers, supra note 28, at 424.
Flaherty, supra note 68, at 178.
89. See BRAIBANT, supra note 68, at 41.
90. Commission nationalede I 'informatiqueet des liberts, 14E RAPPORT D'ACTIVITt 6

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

(1993).
91. Id.
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and which is changing "the conception one has of the individual and the
society., 92 Furthermore, the same section of the 1993 annual report noted:
But a new difficulty looms on the Atlantic horizon. How will the
Americans, who have only embryonic protections [i.e., for
individuals regarding the collection and dissemination of
individually identifiable data], react commercially if Europe places
conditions on the transborder flow of data that they cannot
satisfy?9 3

Even more clearly, the 1992 report to Minister of Labor Aubry, Public
Liberties and Employment, authored by Gerard Lyon-Caen, advocated a
greater emphasis on human dignity. 94 The resulting Aubry Law seemed to
accept this analysis. 95 Lyon-Caen argued that the new technologies of data
collection, treatment and surveillance had created a Foucauldian workplace
where the employee was an object of measure rather than a person.96 Control
was exercised internally to make the worker "transparent", thus robbing her
of human dignity and identity.97 According to Lyon-Caen, this was far
removed from the traditional and legal notions of subordination implied by
the employment contract.9" Contributing to my argument regarding Italy as
well as France, Lyon-Caen suggested that French labor law should more
clearly affirm a right to personal dignity as did the Italian and Spanish worker
statutes.99 This foundation was most important because it recognized the
importance of and provided the protection for social relations in the
workplace. This included real social relations with supervisors who were
present and accessible as human beings."°
With the implementation of the European Community Directive on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data,'t t Prime Minister Jospin commissioned

92. CNIL, supra note 7,at 6.
93. Id.at 7.
94. LYON-CAEN, supra note 35, at 83, 128.
l'preuve des nouvelles
95. See Martine Aubry & Pierre-Louis R~my, Le droitdu travail V1
technologies, 1992 DROIT SOCIAL 522, 523. Martine Aubry was the Minister of Labor who
authored the Aubry Laws for the government.
96. See LYON-CAEN, supra note 35, at 116.
97. See id. at 148, 158.
98. See id. at 117, 154.
99. Id. at 155.
100. Id. at 128-29, 156.
101. See Directive 95/46/EC of Oct. 24, 1995, O.J. 1995, (L 281/31).
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and received a report from the Conseil d'Etat (France's Supreme Court for
administrative law) which noted the emphasis of the Directive and French
law on the protection of human dignity. 0 2 The report warned of the dangers
to human dignity of making decisions about individuals based only on
quantified and computerized data about that individual and of the collection
and transfer of individually identifiable data without the knowledge or
consent of the identified person.0 3 Finally, the report contrasted the French
and European data regulations designed to protect human dignity with the
distinctly more limited American protections for privacy." 4 Both the report
and the Prime Minister have recommended the strengthening of the CNIL's
powers to regulate the collection, processing and use of personalized data.0 5
V. ITALIAN LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE

The protection of workers from electronic monitoring is done differently
in Italy. In France, as is typical in that highly bureaucratic, low-uniondensity country, the CNIL and the Ministry of Labor are charged with
protecting the human dignity of workers from certain forms of data collection
and electronic monitoring. However, the courts have provided some key
interpretations of the law to bolster the authority of the agencies to protect
workers against affronts to human dignity. 0 6 The protections are written into
specific laws and regulations and include the criminal law. In Italy, with a
strong labor movement, creative jurisprudence has placed the protection of
workers' dignity from electronic monitoring more squarely in the hands of
the unions.0 7
Title I of the Italian Workers Statute of 1970, the preamble, is entitled
"Of the Liberty and Dignity of the Worker."' 0 8 Here the emphasis is on
fundamental individual rights and liberties that are considered necessary for
human dignity and act as limits on managerial prerogatives. These individual
rights and liberties are securely established, however, in that they can

102. See

BRIABANT, supra note 68, at 30, 45, 59.
103. See id. at 11-12.
104. See id. at 96-97.
105. See id. at 91-93; Conftrencede Presse de MonsieurLionel Jospin, PremierMinistre,
d VIssue du Comit Interministirielpourla Socit de I 'Information,Hitel de Matignon, 4,
5 (visited Mar. 23, 2000) <http://www.cnil.fr/homcnil.htm>.
106. See Ray & Rojot, supra note 32, at 71-73.
107. See Interview with Vincenzo Ferrante, Prof. of Labor Law, in Instituto GiuridicoCEDRI UniversitA Cattolica de S.Cuore, Milan, Italy (Apr. 20, 1997) (on file with author).
108. Statuo dei Lavoratori, Law no. 300 of May 20, 1970, tit. 1, Gazz. Uff., May 27, 1970,
no. 131 (visited Mar. 23, 2000) <http://www.unipa.it/-cdl/lexall/dcl/70n300.txt>.
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effectively counter the power of an employer on a foundation of collective
rights and the protection of trade union activities. The protection of workers
against electronic surveillance and monitoring clearly shows this dual
structure. 09
The language of Article 4 of the Workers Statute prohibits remote
surveillance of workers by video camera or other devices."0 Furthermore,
the law does not allow an individual worker to consent to such surveillance.
For reasons of business necessity, remote surveillance may be agreed to by
union delegations or works councils. "' The individual worker may still have
legal recourse to challenge the surveillance, even where the union has agreed,
if the means used or the intensity is regarded by the Ministry of Labor or the
courts as an infringement on human dignity." 2 Article 4 clearly targets
monitoring devices not directly related to the employee's work, such as video
and audio recordings." 3 As a result, the installation of telephone accounting
systems, computerized cafeteria inventories, safety monitoring devices and
the electronic recording of sensitive banking and finance transactions have
all required trade union agreement." 4 Under the 1996 Italian law
implementing the European Directive on personal data protection, the
informed consent of each individual employee has been required before
personally identifiable data may be transmitted by any organization that
collects it. 15 For example, the commission charged with administering this
law 1 6 has interpreted it to mean that an employer contracting with an outside
accountant for payroll services needed the consent of each employee whose
payroll data would be transmitted." 7
The debate of the last fifteen years has been over the application of the
Article to electronic monitoring that is made possible by the very equipment
that the employee uses for her or his work, particularly computers or

109. See id. arts. 1, 4, 6 and 8; Spiros Simitis, II diritto del lavoro e la riscoperta
dell'individuo, 45 DLRI 87 (1990).
110. See Statuo dei Lavoratori, Law no. 300 of May 20, 1970, art. 4, para. 1, Gazz. Uff.,
May 27, 1970, no. 131 (visited Mar. 23, 2000) <http://www.unipa.it/-cdl/lexall/dcl/
70n300.txt>.
111. See id. at art. 4, para. 2.
112. See Romei & Sciarra, supra note 42, at 94.
113. See id. at 93.
114. Id. at 96-97.
115. See Tutela delle Persone e di altri Soggetti Rispetto al Trattamento dei Dati Personali,
Law of Dec. 31, 1996, no. 675, art. 11 (Italy) (visited Mar. 23, 2000) <http:I/www.
parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/elelenumhtm>.
116. Id. art. 30.
117. See Ferrante Interview, supra note 107.

2000]

ELECTRONIC MONITORING

computer-controlled machines. 8 While Article 4 was originally drafted with
the video surveillance of workers in a factory in mind, the language of the
article included "other devices.""' 9 Here the courts have followed the
rationale of Article 4 to preserve the human dignity of the worker by
preserving the human element in supervision and a reasonable amount of
autonomy in the performance of the tasks required by the employment
relationship. 2 ° Generally the courts have prohibited the use of software
installed for the purpose of minute and impersonal control of a worker's
performance without prohibiting at the outset the introduction of equipment
incidentally capable of exercising such control. 2 ' For example, the courts
since 1984 have consistently rejected the use of computer software that was
designed to record 2elapsed
time, mistakes, pauses and similar data on
2
individual workers. 1
This debate began in earnest with a criminal case brought against several
IBM Italy executives for violation of Article 4 of the Workers Statute in the
Milan Criminal Court in 1982. 23 The case, decided by the lower criminal
court on December 5, 1984, gave rise to great controversy, appeals and an
eventual settlement. 124 In a lengthy opinion, the court struggled with Article
4's prohibition against remote monitoring of employees and with the penal
sanctions imposed for violation of that Article by Article 38 of the same
statute. 125 The case concerned IBM's introduction of a computerized
workflow analysis system called "Service Level Reporter" (SLR) designed
for the collection of aggregate data on data processing operations.' 26 In
collecting and aggregating data such as numbers of completed and aborted
runs or mean elapsed times on batch jobs and runs, the system also collected
and was capable of reporting data individually for each terminal used to
submit a job. 127 The identification of the terminal, of course, generally
allowed the identification of the individual terminal operator. The evidence
presented to the court by the IBM executives was that the evaluation of

118. See Romei, supra note 46, at 70.
119. See Ferrante Interview, supra note 107.
120. See Bellavista, supra note 46, at 209-10.
121. See Romei & Sciarra, supra note 42, at 93-94.
122. See Bellavista, supra note 46, at 209-10.
123. See Judgment of Dec.5, 1984, Pret. Milano, Riverso ed altri dirigenti della IBM Italia
S.p.A., 1985 RIDL 209.
124. See Ferrante Interview, supra note 107.
125. See Statuo dei Lavoratori, Law no. 300 of 20 May 1970, art. 38, Gazz.Uff., May 27,
1970,no. 131 (visited Mar.23, 2000) <http://www.unipa.it/-cdl/lexall/ dcl/70n300.txt>.
126. See Judgment of Dec. 5, 1984, 1985 RIDL 209, 210.
127. See id. at 210-11.
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individual employee's work was not the purpose for which the system was
installed nor was a report of such individual information ever requested or
used for employee evaluation. 12 8 The case then turned on whether a system
which could potentially be used for the remote monitoring of individual
workers, but was not intended to be so used and was in fact not so used, gave
rise to the penal sanctions of Article 38.29
The court relied heavily on the distinction between the language of
paragraph one and paragraph two of Article 4. Paragraph one states: "It shall
be unlawful to use videocameras and other equipment for the remote
monitoring of workers' activity."'' 30 Paragraph two refers to "[c]ontrol
equipment and appliances required for organisational [sic] and productive
reasons or for work safety but which could be used for the remote monitoring
of workers.... ,,131This latter category of equipment "may be installed only
after obtaining the agreement of the trade union delegations or, failing this,
that of the works council.' 32 The court took for granted that
this provision
133
included the installation of software as well as hardware.
The court reasoned that the legislative intention behind paragraph one
was the outright prohibition, subject to criminal sanction, of the installation
or use of remote-surveillance equipment not directly connected to the firm's
productive purposes or the employees' work. 34 This would include such
equipment as video surveillance devices, audio listening devices and
magnetic badges for tracking the whereabouts of employees.3 3 This type of
equipment, the court found, directly infringed upon the dignity and autonomy
of the worker by subjecting her to constant, impersonal monitoring of her
36
actions.
Paragraph two, on the other hand, dealt with the installation of
equipment that at the outset was directly related to the firm's productive
lllrfl~.~.nnd
1- ..

~.

..

t

- .

olfthe emnlr.x-cc
th
IoArL
v
*w
...*lsv
h-..
. ..

andl was on ....
Iv

I ....

[HytLt lltullf

all

lb

et3

of the remote monitoring of the employees' actions on an individually

128. See id. at 212-13.
129. See id. at 214.
130. Statuo dei Lavoratori, Law no. 300 of 20 May 1970, art. 4, para. 1, Gazz. Uff., May
27, 1970, no. 131 (visited Mar. 23,2000) <http://www.unipa.it/-cdl/lexall/dc 1/70n300.txt>.
131. Id. art. 4, para. 2.
132. Id.
133. See Judgment of Dec. 5, 1984, Pret. Milano, Riverso ed altri dirigenti della IBM Italia
S.p.A., 1985 RIDL 209, 214-15.
134. See id. at 216, 230.
135. See Romei, supra note 46, at 72.
136. See Judgment of Dec. 5, 1984, 1985 RIDL 209, 224, 229.
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identifiable basis. 137 That equipment was subject to certain conditions
limiting its use that could allow its installation. Here the court tried to
balance the employer's interest in the use of equipment that was essential to
the work being done and that monitored work processes for the purpose of
interest in the protection of
improving their efficiency with the employees'
38
autonomy.
and
dignity
human
their
For several reasons the court found the proof of the IBM officials'
criminal culpability insufficient. In the first instance, at the time of the
installation of the computer terminals, the potential of remote monitoring of
individual employees was too speculative and outside of the use intended by
the responsible IBM officials to fall under the prohibitions of Article 4.139
The installation of the SLR system software, however, did fall within those
prohibitions. 4 ° However, the imposition of criminal liability required
knowledge of the system's capabilities for individual employee monitoring
and intent to make use of them, the best evidence of the two elements being
the actual use for individual monitoring.1 41 Second, even if the IBM
executives had some knowledge of the system's potential, a partial
agreement on some aspects of computerized data collection on, and
monitoring of, individual employees had been reached in early 1982 with the
local trade union delegation. 42 The court reasoned that although this
agreement might ultimately be found to be insufficient to cover, or breached
by, the installation of the SLR system, it did throw further doubt on the
and intent necessary for imposing penal sanctions on the
criminal knowledge
143
IBM executives.
In the end the court acquitted the officials on the criminal charges while
expressly noting the possibility of a successful civil action.' In its opinion
the court recognized that the computerized monitoring of an employee's
activities for the purpose of evaluating an individual employee's work was
an assault on that employee's human dignity even where the monitoring was
done by a machine necessary for the employee's work.1 45 Human dignity
required that an employee not be subjected to the impersonal, mechanical,

137.
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139.
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141.
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id. at 229-30.
id. at 231-35.
id. at 238-39.
id. at 240-41.
id. at 241-43.
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id. at 245-48.
id. at 252.
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and constant surveillance of a machine and that an employee not be
'
evaluated impersonally by electronically processed quantitative data alone. 46
The autonomy necessary for protecting human dignity required that an
decisions about the monitoring and
employee participate in collective
47
1
work.
her
or
his
of
evaluation
Ultimately the case was settled based on an extension of the 1982
agreement whereby the company agreed not to collect data attributable to
individual operators except where that data was critical to the operation of
the business. 148 The designation of individually identifiable data critical to
examination by the
business operations would be the subject of a 1joint
49
employer and the union on a case-by-case basis.
As later court cases and commentators have reaffirmed, the basis for
Italian law on the electronic monitoring of workers is that supervision must
have a human dimension and must not be so powerful, continuous,
anonymous, invisible or inflexible as to eliminate a considerable measure of
autonomy or reserve in the employee's performance of a task.15 ° In addition,
supervision must be directly related to the tasks required of the employee and
not disproportional in intensity to the nature and importance of those tasks.' 5 '
Furthermore, the main assurance that these limits are observed by the
employer is the intervention of trade union representatives in the decision
making concerning techniques of supervision. 51 2 Italian jurisprudence has
established these as central elements of the protection ofhuman dignity in the
workplace.' 53
VI. AMERICAN LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE

A. FederalLaw

In contrast, the limitations in the United States on an employer's use of
electronic surveillance and monitoring techniques, based on a narrower

146. See id. at 224.
147. See id. at 225.
148. See id. at 241; Accordo IBM-SEMEA, Milano e RSA, Feb. 23, 1982.
149. See Interview with Chief of Personnel, IBM-SEMEA, Milan (Jan. 7, 1998) (on file
with author).
150. See Mariella Magnani, Diritti della persona e contratto di lavoro: L'esperienza
Italiana, 15 QUADERNI Di DIRITTO DEL LAVORO E DELLE RELAZIONI INDUSTRIALI 47, 53
(1994); Bellavista, supra note 46, at 198.
151. See Romei & Sciarra, supra note 41, at 96-97.
152. See id. at 91.
153. See Magnani, supra note 150, at 50-51.
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concept of protecting a worker's privacy rather than human dignity, are much
less extensive.' 54 There are several putative sources of the legal protection
of workers from electronic surveillance and monitoring in the workplace; on
close investigation, however, these sources provide little protection.15 5 The
"usual suspects" for generating privacy protection in the workplace are the
56
Fourth Amendment's protection from unreasonable searches and seizures,
the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 57 state constitutions and
statutes protecting privacy or barring specific means of surveillance,' 58 and
common law remedies for invasion of privacy or abusive discharge. 59 Of
course, a collective bargaining agreement could explicitly limit the
monitoring of employees, but both practical and legal difficulties exist that
make this rare. To a certain extent both American workers and their
employers begin with a legal concept of privacy that is much narrower than
the Europeans' (at least the workers') notion ofhuman dignity. The territoryand property-oriented concept of privacy that is pervasive in American law
cedes to the employer, the owner of the work premises and equipment, and
the imposer of the terms of employment, a wide latitude in the content and
the means of gathering information about the employees' activities in the
workplace and beyond.
Let us consider the "usual suspects" mentioned above in order. The
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
The Supreme Court has
unreasonable searches and seizures.' 160
electronic gathering of
to
the
apply
right
may
this
that
acknowledged

154. See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 408; Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Secrets: A Policy
Framework,in GENETIC SECRETS, 454 (Mark A. Rothstein ed. 1997).
155. See e.g., Robert Gellman, Does Privacy Law Work?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY:
THENEWLANDSCAPE, 193,209-11 (Philip E. Agre & Marc M. Rotenberg eds., 1997); Kevin
J. Conlon, The Kenneth M. PiperLecture: Privacy in the Workplace, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
285, 286 (1996).
156. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
157. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994).
158. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 22; CAL. CONST., art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST., art. 1, §
23; HAW. CONST., art. I, § 6, 7; ILL. CONST., art. I, § 12; LA. CONST., art. 1, § 5; MONT.
CONST., art. II, § 9; S.C. CONST., art. 1, § 10; WASH. CONST., art. I, § 7; R.I. GEN. LAWS, §
12-5.1-1 (1999).
159. See, e.g., cases dealing with the surveillance of workers after they filed work injury
claims such as: Johnson v. Corporate Special Serv., Inc., 602 So.2d 385, 386 (Ala. 1992) and
Alabama Elec. Coop. v. Partridge, 225 So.2d 848, 851 (Ala. 1969).
160. U.S. CONST., amend. IV § 1.
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information and to employment situations. 6 ' However, this right is only
protected against government action: the Fourth Amendment establishes no
right against unreasonable searches and seizures by private employers.' As
a result government employees may appear to have a somewhat stronger
claim for protection against electronic monitoring and surveillance than
private sector employees. This difference is illusory. To a large extent,
private employment law analogies have entered into the key legal
determination of whether the government employee has a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" regarding the workplace or activity in question.'6 3
The government employer's control of the premises and the equipment, the
implied consent of the worker who is generally informed that monitoring
might take place and the balancing of the magnitude of the intrusion into the
employee's control over personal intimacy or information against the
business necessities and efficiency of the public employer all combine to
greatly limit a government employee's "reasonable expectation of
' 164
privacy.
In O'Connor v. Ortega, a case regarding the physical search of an
employee's desk, Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion held that an
employee's expectation of privacy is limited by "actual office practices" and
"legitimate regulation;"'' 65 that is to say, if monitoring or surveillance were
existing practices known to the employee or the employer had a stated policy
of random or regular surveillance, the employee's expectation of privacy
would be defeated. This clearly leaves the determination of the employee's
reasonable expectation of privacy solely in the hands of the government
employer. The plurality opinion went on to say that
a non-investigatory
66
work-related search is presumed to be reasonable.
Furthermore,
the
work-related
reason
for the surveillance
need
tr
rPson
and it ra
....
one
.....
esosevr or search
tIUlgfll
not hen
anmortan
n he...in
...
treason.an it may be one ..,.y rcasons, even,"thou-gh
the others, standing alone, would render the search or surveillance
improper. 167 It is unlikely then that any apparently work-related reason will
be rejected by a court as the justification for surveillance and monitoring. In
general, courts have not required that the government employer prove the

161. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716 (1987); Mancusi v. De Forte, 392 U.S.
364, 369 (1968).
162. See O'Connor,480 U.S. at 714, 718; Simmons v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 452 F.
Supp. 392, 394-95 (W.D. Okla. 1978), affd., 611 F.2d 342 (10t' Cir. 1979).
163. See O'Connor,480 U.S. at 717.
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See Hanson, supra note 48, at 249-51; Gantt, supra note 31, at 385.
See O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 717.
See id. at 726.
See e.g., Diaz Camacho v. Lopez Rivera, 699 F. Supp. 1020, 1024-25 (D.P.R. 1988).
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actual existence or validity of an alleged work-related purpose for a search
or surveillance. 168 The burden is on the employee to show that an allegedly
work-related search or type of monitoring was clearly unreasonable under
existing law. 169 The Fourth Amendment, enmeshed in the privacy context,
clearly does not address questions of the intensity or impersonality of the
surveillance. Tied to the "state action" requirement, the Fourth Amendment
and its extension through the Fourteenth Amendment do not affect private
employment. 70
'

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 7' ("ECPA")
which updated the Wiretap Act to cover private communications systems and
new forms of electronic communication that were not telephone, telegraph

or radio transmissions, has generally proven ineffective in protecting
employees in the workplace from their employers' monitoring.'72 The ECPA
would seem to have particular relevance to the monitoring of phone calls and

email at work in that it prohibits the interception of data transmitted by wire,
radio or other electronic means.' 73 There are, however, three major
exceptions to the prohibition which give employers virtually a free hand to

engage in such monitoring.

Provisions of the ECPA establish a "provider" exception.' 74 These

provisions allow the provider of a private communication system or its
employees or agents to monitor the use of its equipment.' 7 5 When the
employer provides the equipment and/or the network, or can be seen as the
agent of the provider, monitoring telephone calls and electronic

168. See Hanson, supra note 48, at 256; Gantt, supra note 31, at 382; cf Schowengerdt v.
General Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1334 (9th Cir. 1987); Schowengerdt v. United
States, 944 F.2d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 951 (1992); Shields v.
Burge, 874 F.2d 1201, 1208-9 (7th Cir. 1989); American Postal Workers Union v. United
States Postal Serv., 871 F.2d 556, 560 (6th Cir. 1989); Simmons v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 452 F. Supp. 392, 396 (W.D. Okla. 1978), affd, 611 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1979).
169. See Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1234-35 (D. Nev. 1996); Williams
v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 826 F. Supp. 952, 954 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Star Publ'g Co. v. Pima
County Attorney's Office, 891 P.2d 899, 901 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); Hanson, supra note 48,
at 257.
170. See e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984) and Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974).
171. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521, 2701-2710, 3117, 3121-3126 (1994).
172. See Wilborn, supra note 48, at 839-40.
173. See 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(1)(a) (1994).
174. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 251 1(2)(a)(i) & 2701(c)(1) (1994). The latter section also allows
provider access to stored communications. See id.
175. See id. The statute exempts an officer, agent or employee of a provider of a "wire or
electronic communication service, whose facilities are used in transmission of a wire
communication...." Id.
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communications of its employees, at least where the employer deems it
necessary to protect the business or insure the proper use of the
communication equipment, falls into this exception.176
There is also a business extension exception which removes from the
definition of "device" any telephone or component "furnished to the
subscriber or user by a provider of [the] . . . communication service in the

ordinary course of its business and being used by the subscriber or user in the
ordinary course of its business.... ,177 If the monitoring of calls, voice mail
or email is for the purpose of supervision, evaluation or any other asserted
business interest of the employer, the monitoring is permissible under this
exception. 7 8 This generally includes as well the interception of nonbusiness-related employee communications at least to the extent necessary
to determine that they are such or to determine that the equipment is being
used in an unauthorized manner.'79 If a personal call mentions workplace
activities in any way, it may again fall into the ordinary course of business
exception.1 80
Furthermore, the ECPA excludes any recording or interception of
communications where one of the parties to the communication agrees to the
recording or interception. 8 ' The "agreement" to have one's communications
monitored may be general and implicit.'82 Here again the employer sets the
standards.' 83 If there is an established policy of monitoring or the employee
is at least aware that monitoring may occur, then initial and continued
employment can be seen as consent to the monitoring.'84 Of course, in an atwill employment situation, the employee may be dismissed for refusing to
agree to monitoring.'85 If a party to the communication other than the
1 See
.76.id. It goes on to state that the cxcm.ted provider onay "intercept, disclose or use
that communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity
which is necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or
property of the provider of that service." Cf Lois R. Witt, Terminally Nosy: Employers Free
to Access our Electronic Mail?, 96 DICK. L. REv. 545, 551 (1992).

177. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i) (1994).
178. See James v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579, 581 (10"' Cir. 1979).
179. See Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 583 (11' Cir. 1983).
180. See Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1234-35 (D. Nev. 1996); Epps v. St.
Mary's Hosp., 802 F.2d 412, 417 (1lth Cir. 1986).
181. See 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(2)(d) (1994).
182. See Griggs-Ryan v. Connelly, 904 F.2d 112, 116, 117 (1st Cir. 1990).
183. See Watkins, 704 F.2d at 581-82.
184. See George v. Carusone, 849 F. Supp. 159, 163 (D. Conn. 1994); but see Deal v.
Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1157 (8"' Cir. 1992).
185. See Payne v. Western & At. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884); Paul F. Gerhart,
Employee Privacy Rights in the United States, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 175, 184 (1995).

20001

ELECTRONIC MONITORING

employee under surveillance agrees to1 86the monitoring, there need be no
knowledge or consent of the employee.
If the employee were to store electronic communications on her office
PC hard disk or network storage provided by the employer, the employer
would not be in violation of the ECPA if she searched these storage sites and
read the messages.'8 7 The only electronic storage the ECPA protects is
defined as: "(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic
communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any
storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for
purposes of backup protection of such communication."' 88 Overall court
interpretations and commentators on the ECPA have not regarded it as an
important protection for workers in the workplace. 8 9 Indeed, the legislative
history of the ECPA reflects concern for company privacy rather than that of
individual employees. 9 '
In an interesting counterpoint that highlights the European-U.S.
difference, Northern Telecom settled a lawsuit with its union, the
Communications Workers of America, over the secret electronic monitoring
of employee communications over a thirteen year period. Northern Telecom
renounced its monitoring policy, noting that in Japan and Europe such
monitoring was already banned with no detrimental effect on business
performance.'9

186. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i) (1994).
187. See U.S. v. Mullins, 992 F.2d 1472 (9 ' Cir. 1992). Cf Kevin Baum, E-Mail in the
Workplace and the Right of Privacy,42 VILE. L. REv. 1011, 1029-30 (1997).
188. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(17)(A)&(B) (1994).

189. For cases, see supra notes 179-80, 183-85; for commentators, see infra note 190.
190. Wilborn, supra note 48, at 848-49; Anne L. Lehman, Comment: E-mail in the
Workplace: Question ofPrivacy, Property or Principle?,5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 99, at
text accompanying notes 25-39 (1997); Rod Dixon, Windows Nine-to-Five: Smyth v.
Pillsburyand the Scope ofan Employee's Right ofPrivacy in Employer Communications, 2

J.L. & TECH 4 at text accompanying notes 39-42 (1997); Conlon, supra note 155, at
287-88; Gantt, supra note 31, at 350; Thomas R. Greenberg, E-Mail and Voice Mail:
VA.

Employee Privacy and the Federal Wiretap Statute, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 219, 251 (1994);
Laurie Thomas Lee, Watch Your E-mail! Employee E-MailMonitoringand Privacy Law in
the Age ofthe "ElectronicSweatshop", 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 139, 157 (1994); Donald R.
McCartney, Comment: Electronic Surveillance and the Resulting Loss of Privacy in the

Workplace, 62 UMKC L. REV. 859, 890 (1994); Julia Turner Baumhart, The Employer's
Right to Read Employee E-Mail: ProtectingProperty or PersonalPrying?, 8 LAB. L. 923,

925 (1992).
191. See Parrish v. Northern Telecom, C.A. no. 3-90-0790 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); Northern
Telecom Bans Secret Monitoring; CWA Agreement Sets Major Privacy Precedent, PR

NEWSW1RE, Jan. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS/NEXIS, PRNEWS File.
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B. State Law

While several states have constitutional provisions guaranteeing a right
to privacy, only one state, California, has held that the right to privacy applies
to private as well as governmental employers.' 92 The employer must show

a "compelling interest" to justify an intrusion upon the employees right to
privacy. 193 However, the California Superior Court, in Flanaganv. Epson
America, refused to apply the right to privacy to a private employee's email.' 94 The court suggested that the extension of constitutional privacy

rights was for the legislature, not the judiciary. 95
Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have statutes similar to
the federal ECPA, prohibiting the interception of electronic
communications. 96

Many of these states echo the one party consent,

"business extension" and "provider" exemptions of the ECPA. Thirteen
states require that prior consent must be given by all parties to the
communication.1 97 Twenty-two states and Washington, D.C. have no
"business extension" exception or restrict the "provider" exception to
communication common carriers.'98 In thirty-one states and D.C., therefore,
the electronic communication privacy statutes seem to provide protection for
employees superior to the ECPA as long as the interception occurs within

192. See Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 641 (Cal. 1994); Porten
v. Univ. of S. F., 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976); Semore v. Pool, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280 (Ct. App.
1990), reh. den. 5 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 672 (1990). See also Conlon, supra note 155, at 287;
Wilborn, supra note 48, at n.65; Lee, supra note 190, at 144.
193. See Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Ct. App. 1990), cert. den.
Il1 S.Ct. 344 (1980).
194. See Flanagan v. Epson Am., No. BC007036, slip op. at 4(Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, i99 1);
cf Baum, supra note 187, at 1019-20.
195. See Flanagan, slip op. at 4.
196. The only states that do not have such statutes are South Carolina and Vermont.
197. California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Washington all require
both parties' consent to the monitoring. See CAL. PENALCODE §§ 631 (a), 632(a) (West 1996);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-570d (1997); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 11, § 1336(b) (1995); FLA. STAT.
ch. 934.03(2)(d) (1995); GA. CODEANN. § 16-11-66(a) (1996); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/142 (West 1993); MD. CODEANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402(c)(3) (1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 272 99(B)(4) (West 1990); MICH. COMvp. LAWS ANN. § 750.539c (West 1991);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213(c) (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2 (1986); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5703-04 (West 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030(1)(b) (West
1988).
198. These jurisdictions are Alabama, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, and Texas.
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their jurisdiction. 9 9 This appearance is deceptive. The Illinois courts, for
example, have interpreted the apparent all-party consent requirement to mean
at least one party."' 0 As all of the states are also at-will employment states,
the implied consent of all employee participants in a communication is
assumed in most cases. Furthermore, while these statutes apply to the
monitoring of telephone and wire communications, they do not reach other
forms of electronic monitoring and surveillance. State bills to strengthen the
protections of workers against electronic monitoring in the workplace have
generally failed because of sustained and effective corporate lobbying.20 '
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, the definitive treatment of state
common law regarding privacy recognizes "the unreasonable intrusion into
a person's seclusion"20 2 as the sole relevant basis for establishing privacy
rights in the workplace. These words themselves seem immediately
inappropriate for the workplace where a person is on the premises owned by
another and in the presence of co-workers and the employer. The intrusion
claim implies an unreasonable and objectionable prying into something one
has a right to keep private. Outside of the employment setting there are two
independent considerations: (1) Did the individual intruded upon have a
legitimate expectation of privacy?; (2) Did the legally protected interests of
the intruder outweigh the legitimate expectation of privacy? When the claim
is moved into the employment arena, courts have conflated the two
2 3 The
considerations, allowing the employer's interests to dominate.
employer may unilaterally change the employee's expectation of privacy by
instituting a policy of intrusion or by simply intruding on one or more
occasions. As the employer has the right to manage the employee for the
employer's business purposes, there is little that the employee has a right to
keep private if it impinges in any way on the workplace. 2 4 The employee
consents to any intrusions by remaining at work after becoming aware of the
intrusion or the possibility of such an intrusion. 2 5 Finally, an at-will

199. See Conlon, supra note 155, at 289; Lee, supra note 191, at Table 2.
200. See People v. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346, 350 (Il. App. Ct. 1986).
201. See Lee, supra note 190, at 146. On lobbying over privacy concerns, see generally
Matthew W. Finkin, The Kenneth M.PiperLecture: Employee Privacy,American Values and
the Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 221, 224 (1996).
202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
203. See, e.g., Baggs v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 957 F.2d 268, 274 (6th Cir. 1992);
Thomas v. General Elec. Co., 207 F.Supp. 792, 799 (W.D. Ky. 1962); Jackson v. Nationwide
Credit, Inc., 426 S.E.2d 630, 632 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); King, supra note 48, at 460-61.
204. See Finkin, supra note 201, at 256.
205. See Pauline T. Kim, PrivacyRights, PublicPolicy, and the Employment Relationship,
57 OHIO ST.L.J. 671, 675-76 (1996); Wilborn, supra note 48, at 834-35.
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employee who objects to the intrusions or the policies allowing them may be
immediately dismissed.2 °6
2. 7 clearly takes up and severely restricts any common
Smyth v. Pillsbury
law right to privacy of e-mail communications for an at-will employee.
Smyth claimed that he was wrongfully discharged from his position as
regional operations manager when Pillsbury discharged him for sending
sarcastic and critical e-mail communications to his supervisor.0 8 Smyth had
received e-mail communications sent from his supervisor's computer at
Pillsbury to Smyth's home computer. The two employees then exchanged
e-mail communications concerning recent developments involving
Pillsbury's sales management staff.20 9 The supervisor deemed Smyth's
comments inappropriate.2 10 The Smyth court held that an at-will employee
had no right of privacy in the contents of his or her e-mail when it was sent
over the employer's e-mail system. 2 1' The court concluded that, in a
Pennsylvania common law cause of action for wrongful discharge, an at-will
employee does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents
of his e-mail communications sent through his employer's e-mail system.2t 2
The court held further that an employer's interest in preventing inappropriate
comments or illegal activity from being transmitted over its e-mail system far
outweighs any privacy interest an employee may have in his e-mail
communications. 213 While the court seemed to take a strained and
unsophisticated view of the issues at stake, it provided the most recent
of protecting workers by means of any
statement on the extreme difficulty
21 4
U.S. common law of privacy.
With regard to computer-based surveillance, in Barksdale v. IBM Corp.,
the court dismissed short-term employees' claims of violation of the right to
privacy stating that "[t]he Defendant's observation and recording of the
number of errors the. Plaintiffs ma de in tasks they wereinstdc.. c to.p erormcan hardly be considered an intrusion upon the Plaintiffs 'solitude or

206. See Roe v. Quality Transportation Services, 838 P.2d 128 (Wash. 1992); Jennings v.
Minco Tech. Labs. Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497,499-502 (Tex. 1989); King, supra note 48, at 457.
207. 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

See id. at 98.
See id. at 98-99.
See id. at 99.
See id. at 101.
See id.
See id.
See generally Dixon, supra note 190. See also Finkin, supra note 201, at 227-28;

Lehman, supra note 190, at 105-7.
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seclusion .. or their private affairs and concerns. ' ' 21 5 While this was an
unusual case because of the short-term nature of the employment and the job
of testing the visibility of computer monitors, it still made clear that the
employer defined the reasonableness of the employees' expectations of
privacy by the nature of the tasks he assigned and the practices he
followed.216
VII. CONCLUSION: OTHER NOTIONS OF PRIVACY
THAT BORDER ON HUMAN DIGNITY

The foregoing analysis of the deficiencies of the U.S. legal concept of
privacy in the workplace as a protection against electronic surveillance does
not preclude the fact that there have been attempts in the U.S. legal culture
to develop a more comprehensive notion of privacy that would have some of
the impact of notions of human dignity and autonomy. The Prosser/
Restatement of Torts view of privacy that dominates U.S. law has not gone
unchallenged in the American legal community. Edward Bloustein argued
compellingly in direct response to Prosser's seminal 1960 article that Prosser
and American courts have misconstrued the very founders of the common
217
law right to privacy in the U.S., Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis.
Bloustein noted that their 1890 HarvardLaw Review article was very clear
on the point that the right to privacy derived, not from notions of private
21 8
property (as courts have declared), "but that of inviolate personality.,
Bloustein concluded this meant, "the individual's independence, dignity, and
219
integrity; it defines man's essence as a unique and self-determining being.,
And as had Warren and Brandeis, Bloustein in the end warned that
The personnel practices of government and large-scale corporate
enterprise increasingly involve novel forms of investigation of
personal lives.... And the information so gathered is very often
stored, correlated and retrieved by electronic machine techniques.

215. Barksdale v. IBM Corp., 620 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (W.D.N.C. 1985), aff'd, 1 I.E.R.
Cas. (BNA) 560 (4th Cir. 1986).
216. See Gantt, supra note 31, at text accompanying notes 223-25; Wilborn, supra note 48,
at 845; Robert G. Boehmer, ArtificialMonitoringand SurveillanceofEmployees: The Fine
Line Dividing the PrudentlyManaged Enterprisefrom the Modern Sweatshop, 41 DEPAUL
L. REV. 739, 804-5 (1992).
217. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
218. Id. at 205.
219. Bloustein, supra note 31, at 163.
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The combined force of the new techniques for uncovering personal
intimacies and the new techniques of electronic use of this personal
data threatens to uncover inmost thoughts and feelings.220
In another frequently quoted article, Ruth Gavison stated:
Our interest in privacy.., is related to our concern over our
accessibility to others: the extent to which we are known to
others, the extent to which others have physical access to us,
and the extent to which we are the subject of others'
attention. This concept of privacy as a concern for limited
accessibility enables us to identify when losses of privacy
occur. Furthermore, the reasons for which we claim privacy
in different situations are similar. They are related to the
functions privacy has in our lives: the promotion of liberty,
autonomy, selfhood, and human relations, and furthering the
existence of a free society. The coherence of privacy as a
concept and the similarity of the reasons for regarding losses
of privacy as undesirable support the notion that the legal
system should make an explicit commitment to privacy as a
value that should be considered in reaching legal results.221
The explicit recognition of the broad concept of privacy Gavison
recommends would give an employee's privacy claims regarding employer
collected data much greater weight in any balancing against the employer's
interest in the efficiency of his business operations. Courts very rarely seem
to accept this expanded notion of privacy. In a very few cases dealing with
....
,
.
the "telephone extension" and "ordinarv course ,fbusins
the ECPA have held that excessive monitoring by employers, particularly if
covert, may lead to ECPA violations.222
But as James Rule and his colleagues noted in The Politics of Privacy,
this balancing in itself may be the problem. Privacy and data protection laws
frame the issues too narrowly. While public policies that seek to "balance"
privacy rights with organizational demands for information may produce a
fairer and more efficient management of personal data, they cannot control
the growing inherent demand and technological capacity of bureaucratic
220. Id. at 191.

221. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423-4 (1980).
222. See e.g. Sanders v. Robert Bosch Corp., 38 F.3d 736 (4' Cir. 1994); Deal v. Spears,
980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346 (10"h Cir. 1974); James
v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579 (10"' Cir. 1979).
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institutions to gather, store and access detailed personal information. 23
Against this, policies of outright prohibition of specific technologies and of
gathering certain kinds of data may be the only answer, however
temporary. 24
Several legislative bodies have unsuccessfully attempted to control
electronic monitoring in the workplace based upon a much broader notion of
privacy that encompassed human dignity. The foremost was the Privacy for
Consumers and Workers Act of 1993 ("PWCA").225 Supporters of the bill
argued that the technocrats who designed workplace surveillance systems had
forgotten the humanity of employees.2 26 If the technology slices people up
into tiny pieces and views them under a microscope, their spirit is destroyed.
They argued that the bill would take steps toward treating employees with
respect and dignity. 22 7 The bill defined electronic monitoring broadly:
[T]he collection, storage, analysis, or reporting of information
concerning an individual's activities by means of a computer,
electronic observation and supervision, telephone service
observation, telephone call accounting, or other form of visual,
auditory, or computer-based technology which is conducted by any
method other than direct observation by another person, including
the following methods: Transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature which are transmitted in
whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic,
or photo-optical system.228
Section 4 of the bill required an employer to provide a prior written
notice to each employee to be monitored.22 ' The notice had to describe the
forms of electronic monitoring to be used, the personal data to be collected,
and the hours and days that monitoring would occur.230 The employer also

223. See

JAMES RULE ET AL., THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY: PLANNING FOR PERSONAL DATA

SYSTEMS AS POWERFUL TECHNOLOGIES 22 (1980).

224. See COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY 252 (1992).
225. See H.R. 1900, 103rd Cong., (1993); S. 984, 103rd Cong., (1993).
226. See Hearingon H.R. 1900 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-ManagementRelations of
the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 103rd Cong., 16, 62 (1993); Hearing on S. 984
Before the Subcomm. on Employment andProductivity of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 103rd Cong. 21 (1993).
227. See id.
228. S. 984, 103rd Cong. § 2(1)(A) (1993).
229. See id. at § 4(b).
230. See id. at § 4(b)(1)-(3).
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was required to explain how the data obtained would be used and provide a
description of the monitoring."' Furthermore, the same section required the
employer to inform prospective employees in writing of existing forms of
monitoring.232
Section 5 of the bill permitted unlimited random monitoring of
employees only in the first sixty days of employment.233 For employees with
less than five years and greater than sixty days of employment, random
monitoring could not exceed two hours per week. 3 Monitoring of workers
with at least five years employment in the enterprise was prohibited, except
in cases of suspicion of criminal activity or of gross misconduct damaging to
the business.235
Section 8 of the bill prohibited the employer from taking any action
against an employee based on the personal data obtained by electronic
monitoring unless the employer was in compliance with all requirements of
the PCWA.2 36 Nor could an employer use quantitative data obtained by
monitoring that records the amount of work performed by an employee
within a specific time as the sole basis for individual employee performance
evaluation or to set production quotas or work performance expectations.237
If an employer had an immediate need for specific data while the employee
concerned was unavailable, the employer could access the data if it was
alphanumeric and was not an employee communication, so long as the data
was not used for employee discipline or performance evaluation, and the
employer notified the concerned employee of his access to the information.238
Additional provisions prohibited electronic monitoring in bathrooms,
locker rooms, or dressing rooms unless the employer has a reasonable
suspicion that an employee was engaged in unlawful activity2 39 and
prohibited the intentional use or dissemination of personal data obtained by
electronic monitoring of an employee when the employee was exercising
First Amendment rights.240

23 1. See id. at
232. See id. at
233. See id. at
234. See id. at
235. See id. at
236. See id. at
237. See id. at
238. See id. at
239. See id. at
240. See id. at

§ 4(b)(4)-(5), (8).
§ 4(c)(2).
§ 5(b)(1).
§ 5(b)(2).
§ 5(b)(3).
§ 8(a).
§ 8(b)(1)-(2).
§ 9(a)(1)-(3).
§ 9(b)(B)(1)-(3).
§ 9(c)(1).
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Similar unsuccessful legislation proposed in Massachusetts and
effectively resisted by business interests specified the rights it sought to
advance in this manner:
1) Right to Know: Employees have the right to know if, when, and
how they are being monitored along with how the information
gathered will be used.
2) Right to Privacy: Employees should be protected from
monitoring that is irrelevant to job performance.
3) Right to Due Process: Employees have access rights to
information collected through monitoring, and must be given access
to the information in a timely manner if the information is to be
used against them.
4) Right to Human Dignity: Employees have the right to be
evaluated by means other than electronic monitoring, because a
human side 2to41 every job exists which cannot be evaluated
electronically.
In West Virginia a statute prohibiting secret telephone monitoring was
passed in 198 1.242 AT&T, which had engaged extensively in such monitoring
prior to the passage of the statute, was forced to discontinue its secret
monitoring of telephone operators responses to customers. 243 Even though
during the two years following the passage of the law, the West Virginia
AT&T division was rated outstanding in the Bell System on customer
service, the company successfully lobbied for the repeal of the legislation in
1983.244 AT&T's lobbying efforts included the threat not to locate a planned
major manufacturing facility in West Virginia.2 45
The failure of these pieces of legislation makes clear that the
incorporation in U.S. law of a broader notion of privacy which includes
human dignity is strongly resisted. The West Virginia legislation, the PCWA
and the Massachusetts bill were implacably opposed by business interests

241. Shefali N. Baxi & Alisa A. Nickel, Big Brotheror Better Business: Striking a Balance
in the Workplace, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 137, 145 (1994). Concerning earlier attempts
at passing such legislation, cf Note, Addressing the New Hazards of the High Technology
Workplace, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1898, 1908-9 (1991).
242. See Hearingon S. 984 Before the Subcomm. on Employment and Productivityof the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 103rd Cong. 21 (1993).
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See id.
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and that opposition led to their repeal or defeat. 246 Although a change in the
composition of Congress might lead to the revival of the PCWA or a similar
bill, its passage would still be questionable. Likewise, as the foregoing
analysis has attempted to show, American jurisprudence has not broadened
the notion of privacy for the protection of workers' autonomy from overly
intense or highly impersonal forms of supervision. This expanded notion of
privacy does not seem to be a logical extension of the Prosser definition of
the tort of invasion of privacy. It may, therefore, be strategically wise for
those who advocate an extension of worker autonomy and restrictions on
subordination in the workplace to attempt to move the debate to a notion of
human dignity that must be protected wherever a person is and whoever
defines the tasks that must be performed. In addition, human dignity as a
value is much more closely related to collective action and to the sharing of
decision-making power and thus more in tune with the purposes and actions
of labor unions to protect workers. Privacy, on the other hand, implies the
protection of solely individual interests against all others. An emphasis on
human dignity may lead to policies that reflect the higher standards of worker
protection and participation existing in French and Italian law.

246. See id., Baxi & Nickel, supra note 241, and Note, supra note 241.

